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The purpose of this thesis is to determine an optimum
Naval Airborne Tactical Electronic Warfare System from
selected components. Its characteristics of performance will
be derived from particular mission requirements, generated
from Ecuadorian naval tactical operational needs.
In history there are plenty of examples that confirm
that a military action will better succeed if sufficient
reconnaissance/surveillance has supported the final decision.
In this particular case, an ESM system must provide sufficient
and accurate information in order to locate the enemy and
clarify the tactical situation, that is; what are the enemy
forces disposition, strength, intentions, discretion,
readiness, etc.?. In other words, the ESM receiver should
collect data from all the emitters of interest, over a wide
frequency spectrum, over large angular regions, and with
sufficient sensitivity to improve detection ranges; then it
must measure and process this information quickly and
accurately for immediate use as a decision basis.
There are basical ly three different kinds of receivers
available in a very mature technological state: a.) Crystal
Video Receivers ( C V R ) , b.) Instantaneous Frequency
Measurement ( I FM ) and c.) Superheterodyne. The particular
characteristics of each one of them, will be analyzed to
identify their applicability to Naval requirements.
A. BACKGROUND
In the past twenty years, there has been a growing
interest among Third-World nations in strengthening the naval
presence in oceanic areas of interest, justified by principles
and policies of military strategy, and due to the natural
growth or maturity achieved with time and experience.
The late sixties brought about challenging new weapons:
the Sea skimming surface to surface missile (SSM's) , and the
fast attack missile boat (FAMB's). As a result the concepts
of Naval Warfare were shaken with the enormous changes that
these two weapons represented to the traditional way of making
wa r at sea
.
Subsequently, both the FAMB's and the SSM's were proven
in different actions around the world, and due to their
successes many Navies have adopted them as the "pattern to
follow", even though in many cases they were not wisely
utilized, or were not used for those purposes for which both
the missile or the FAME were appropriate. There are many
examples to cite, where countries have acquired FAMB's for
purposes of patrolling their Exclusive Economic Zone but found
them to be not cost-effective. In other cases, endurance
and seakeeping capabilities of the FAMBs have been
overestimated. The fact is that the presence of FAMB's
represents a threat to forces attempting to penetrate their
defensive zones. Additionally, their cost of operation is
much less than for a Destroyer or Frigate.
Ecuador is a particular case where FAMB's were bought in
order to replace Second World War vintage destroyers,
achieving at low cost a considerable power projection
capability. This was not the best solution for two reasons:
First because of the geographical situation of that
country, (located at the Northwestern part of South America
and with a wide open sea in front of it) was not the best
environment for missile boat operations since they are better
used in restricted waters. And second, the large open ocean
area, combined with the limited endurance and surveillance
capabilities of the FAMB's, made it very impractical to
search, locate, attack and destroy threats with the required
level of success. As with bigger ships, the problem of
searching and locating the enemy remains the key point for
success at sea, and this is very difficult to solve with the
limitations of the FAMB's. In any case, during the UN I TAS
operations held from 1984 to 1986 (in which the author
participated), an experimental solution was operationally
tested which consisted of combining a Surface Attack Group
with a P-3C, where the aircraft carried the task of searching
for and locating enemy forces and then vectoring the missile
boats towards the threat until they reached missile launching
p o si 1 ion.
3
It may be important to note that operating with this
combination gave very significant results in extending the
effective operational radius of the FAMB's and their
lethality, especially when engaging surface forces with
limited air support. Clearly, the aircraft tasks were of
extreme importance, and particularly the ESM tactics and
techniques employed which were paramount to overall mission
success. In addition to this, the aircraft enjoyed the
advantage of its versatility which allowed it to selectively
operate its active emitters, and thereby approach closer to
the target (under certain conditions) for positive
i dent i f i cat i on
.
It is becoming evident that a cost-effective solution for
improving ones own power projection capabilities is to outfit
surveillance aircraft with appropriate ESM systems, and to
develop the related tactics for their employment either alone
or in combination with a Surface Attack Group. This thesis
will analyze several airborne ESM System in order to
satisfactorily accomplish the mission and operational
requirements as stated above.
I I . SCENARIO
The scenario considered by this thesis is that of a Naval
aircraft in Electronic Warfare surveillance operations
attempting to target an already classified enemy ship. The
aircraft will have the support of an Surface Attack Group
(SAG) for weapons delivery on the target.
The object of the ESM mission is to obtain and process
sufficient and accurate ESM data. This is not a simple matter
since many complex parameters are involved. Some parameters
may no be improved without trading off the performance of the
system in another area. Other parameters are under the
enemy's control or are of random nature. This thesis is
limited to a particular scenario, which is divided into three
spec ific parts:
- The Geographical region,
- Ones own forces and,
- The possible threat
A. THE GEOGRAPHICAL REGION
The Geographical region of interest is the Northwestern
part of South America, (where Ecuador is located) from the
coastline up to about 900 miles westward, and Northward to
the Panama Canal. Historically, the extent of the region has
been justified by both national and hemispherical interests.
Actually, Ecuador's national maritime interests are the
protection of its Economic Exclusive Zone and maritime
communication lines; and in the case of an hemispherical
threat, the navies of this region will have to share the
responsibilities for protection of vital maritime
communication lines. In fact, the most recent UN1TAS
operations have underscored this point by increasing the joint
exercises between the navies of Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela,
and the USA, on both the Atlantic and the Pacific sides of
the Panama Canal. Ecuador possesses naval and aeronaval
facilities along the Pacific coast and in the Galapagos
Islands which are located 600 miles west of the continent.
B. FRIENDLY FORCES
The available forces will be mostly Missile Boats
ranging upwards from 125 Tons to 800 Tons, equipped with ESM
equipment on board. Actually, Ecuador possesses a missile
force of 6 Corvettes and 6 fast attack missile boats. Since
each different sized FAMB will have different endurance, it
is necessary to deploy them wisely according to mission
characteristics, scale of conflict and nature of the threat.
In any case, during the crucial initial phases of the
encounter, both surveillance and command and control
requirements must be accomplished by the ESM aircraft in order
to achieve the required degrees of surprise and accuracy in
the surface attack.
The main weapon chosen was the French Exocet MM38 and
MM40 missiles with 21 and 40 nautical miles of range
respect i ve 1 y
.
As was stated above, the deployment of forces depends
on complex own and enemy related factors. The following are
examples of scenarios that might happen and how own forces
would be arranged, according to range from the advanced bases
ava i 1 ab 1 e
.
1. Close to Coast Engagements (up to 100 nm. )
It would be advisable to use mostly smaller FAMB's,
with the size of the threat determining how many boats will
be dispatched to achieve a power advantage.
2. Medium Range Engagements (100 to 200 nm.)
In this scenario, the general choice is to select
larger FAMBs. However if enemy classification is obtained in
time, it might be advisable to send a combination of FAMB's,
with the smaller units closer to the target, thereby allowing
simultaneously firing of the MM38 and MM40 missiles. With
this deployment, one can exploit the proven advantages of
relative Radar and ESM detection ranges, using the smaller
FAMB's with their reduced radar cross sections to proceed
closer to their targets.
3. Long Range Engagements (> 200 nm. )
Longer endurance units (Corvettes) will be required
for this scenario, but the attack group must also include a
sufficient number of FAMB's to counter the threat size.
Some scenario parameters evaluated as common to all
the cases described above are:
a) The surveillance aircraft must detect, classify,
identify and locate the enemy ship prior to further action;
and additionally to this, it must vector and command the
attack group properly until the point where Boats' commanders
assume total control of the action.
b
)
A minimum of 2 attacking units will be required.
c) A minimum of 2 missiles will be fired at each
target to increase the probability of hit.
d) After the attack has been made, the units will
leave the area at full speed.
e The surveillance aircraft will be used for
evaluating the results of the attack, and /or collecting
valuable information that might support conclusions about the
outcome of the action or previous situation. Using this
information it will allow:
1) Reengagement if the situation is favorable.
2) Relocation of additional ships if saturation
of enemy's defenses is required,
or
,
3) Launch of a second attack if the enemy's
reaction has been weak and slow.
f) Prior to and during the attack, the deployed
SAG will maintain a distance between units of about 5 to 15
miles for ESM t r i angu 1 at i on , UHF communication purposes, and
for fire power coverage.
All these courses of action are derived from the
information obtained by electronic surveillance during the
search and detection phase of the engagement.
C. THE POSSIBLE THREAT
The threat which this thesis analyzes, is a surface
warship such of a destroyer or cruiser type, acting as a
picket of a surface force, or as part of a surface action
group, and having little or no airborne early warning support.
Additionally, the ship will have an on-board he 1 o for anti-
surface operations.
The main weapons system for this ship consists of a
medium range AA missile (30 to 40 nm.), a short range AA
missile (10 nm. ) and o ve r -
1
he-hor i zon surface to surface
m i ss i 1 es
.
In order to properly accomplish) these tasks, this ship
will have the following sensors:
1 Long range air search radar (frequency agility
capab 1 e )
,
1 Medium range-low altitude air search radar,
1 Tactical surface search radar,
1 Navigation radar,
3 Fire control radars, and
1 Surface search radar on the helo.
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I I I - ESM AND THE PARAMETERS TO BE MEASURED
A. ENVIRONMENTAL ELECTRONIC DENSITY
The environmental electronic density plays a key role in
the design of the ESM system, since this density establishes
some of the operational requirements under which the system
will be developed.
For example, the number of emitters and their
transmitting characteristics, their location relative to own
receiver, the level of hostilities, and the type of mission
to be accomplished by own forces, are among all the factors
that outline the environment one will work with.
According to Ref.[5] the electromagnetic density for
systems with sensitivity below -70 dBm is particularly
altitude independent. This particular value deserves to be
mentioned because we will be refer back to it later when the
ESM parameters are defined and analyzed within each System
conf iguration.
From the model cited above, and using the formula for
maximum unambiguous range, we can estimate the pulse density
to be the following (pulses per second):
PRF = c/2 • range (2-1)
where :
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PRF = Pulse repetition Frequency (pulses per second)
c = Speed of light
range= Maximum Unambiguous Range
The radars expected to be present are:
a) Long range search radar (aerial) 300 Fp. ( 277nm . range
)
b) Medium range search (aerial) 1012 Fp (80 nm. range)
c) Tactical surface search 1079 Fp. (75 nm. range)
d ) Navigation radar 1620 Fp. (50 nm range)
e) Fire control radars (3) 2699 Fp. (30 nm range)
f) Search radar (Heio) 1000 Fp. (80 nm range)
This makes a total of 13, 108 Fp for each ship in the case
where all the sensors are radiating. This number give us a
good starting point for the analysis since, as stated above,
we might expect to find more than one enemy ship in the zone,
in addition, merchant ships will be in the area and at some
stage we will also have to count own ships radars. Assuming
that we wiii encounter a maximum of 10 ships with similar
characteristics to those cited above, all transmitting their
radars simultaneously, we will have a total Pulses per Second
of 131.080 Fp (pps .
For the purposes of this thesis the airborne system will
have a processing capability of about 300,000 pulses per
second, in order to satisfy and exceed, within a sufficient
level, the requirements imposed by the tactical situation.
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B- PARAMETERS UE IN1EREST
In order to create a decision basis, an ESli system must
detect and process many parameters from the emitter, and the
more parameters are obtained and successfully analyzed, the
easier is to determine the emitter s identity.
Additionally, some ESM parameters are considered more
valuable than others in a given situation; such as the Angle
of Arrival ( AOA ) or- the frequency characteristics of the
intercepted signal
,
which contribute the most to emitter
identification. Generally, the ESM receiver will be required
to measure the following parameters from the emitter:
Angle of arrival (AOA),
Frequency ( f )
»
Time of arrival ( 1 OA )
,




These parameters have been intentionally ordered
according to their importance to mission accomplishment
(i.e., sorting and identification).
As can be found on the commercial market, ESM receivers
range from detecting one to detecting all of the above
parameters., but if emitter sorting, classification and
identification are required (which is usually the case with
naval ESM) a minimum of three parameters are needed.
»
A basic receiver scheme is independent of which







Fig. 1, Basic receiver system
C. DYNAMIC RANGE AND SENSITIVITY
Dynamic Range and Sensitivity are of extreme importance
in ESM receiver design. If performance in both are poorly
realized, the overall system performance will be seriously
degraded. On the other hand, if good dynamic range and
sensitivity are available at the receiver, then many
parameters such as detection range, accuracy of the
measurements, sorting capability, probability of detection,
etc. wil 1 give the system and the user an advantageous
decision basis. In the author's point of view, any design




The Dynamic Range defines the range of input power
over which the receiver will work properly, generally
expressed in decibels (dB). The lower limit of the dynamic
range is the system's sensitivity, and the upper is defined
in different manners, the most common being the one dB
compression point. The input power is linearly related to the
output power, but as the input power increases there is a
certain limit where the output power loses its linear
relationship and falls below the ideal. When the difference
between the ideal linear receiver and the actual output power
is 1 dB, then the value of the input power (at which the 1 dB
difference occurs) is the upper limit of the required dynamic
range.
If the input power goes above this limit, the
receiver saturates, the gain is lowered, and spurious signals
will appear at the Receiver's output. To cope with the
expected range of the signals strengths, a Dynamic Range of
at least 65 dB is required.
2. Receiver Sensitivity
The System's Sensitivity defines the weakest signal
power that can be detected by the System and generate an
output where the Signal to Noise ratio meets the minimum
r equ i r ed
.
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As will be addressed later in the detectability
problem, a certain minimum power level of the target emitter
is also required to produce a detection at a given
probability. The emitter's radiation power must compete
inside the ESM receiver with the intrinsic thermal noise
(internally generated) that represents the floor of the
system. The sensitivity floor is a function of both noise
power and signal to noise ratio (SNR).
The noise power (N) at the receiver's output is
modeled by the well known following relationship that assumes






k • To • Bn • Fn
-23
1.38 • 10 Boltzman's constant
Noise Temperature (in Kelvin)
Receiver noise Bandwidth (Hz.)
Receiver noise Figure
(3-1 )
If we use T = 290° K, and express the power in
mi 1 1 i wa 1 1 s then
:
N(dBm) = -174 dBm + 10 log (Bn) + 10 log (Fn)(3-2)
The receiver noise figure ( Fn ) relates the actual
noise power output to the ideal receiver's output,
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The effective noise bandwidth ( B n ) becomes a very
important consideration when instantaneous wideband receivers
are used, therefore, even though a wide bandwidth might be
available for- interception at the receiver's front end, this
does not represent directly the noise power available because
when the signal reaches the detector, most of the original
noise is filtered out by the narrow bandwidth of the video
stage. This is referred to sometimes as "Processing Gain",
and it is proportional to the ratio of the Acceptance







Gamma varies from 0.5, (when the ratio Brf/Bv is
large) to about 0.8 or 0.9 for Superheterodyne receivers
( Brf/Bv - 2, approx. )
.








Pt = Radar transmitter peak power (watts)
Gt = Radar transmitter antenna gain
Gesm = ESM receiver antenna gain
\ = c/f; Wavelength (meters)
g = Multipath factor
R = Range between radar and ESM receiver
Lesm = ESM receiver losses
Lt = Radar transmitter losses
The Signal to noise ratio will be defined by
combining the previous three equations:





Where Bn is in Hertz.
These two definitions, noise floor and SNR, are
quite important because they represent the basis for the
following system design. Two parameters directly related to
the noise and SNR of the system are the maximum detection
range and the probability of detection / false alarm.
The power advantage of the ESM receiver comes from
2 4its 1/R propagation loss versus the 1/R propagation loss
for the radar.
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In Fig. 1 we see the relationship between signal
power received at the ESM and radar receivers in dBw as a
function of range, showing a difference that increases with
d i s tance
.
In appendix A, MATHCAD 2.0 is used for solving the
equations and plotting the variations of signal power at
reception, both at the Radar and at the ESM receiver, given
their characteristics. Figure 2 shows the 1/R advantage of
the ESM receiver which al lows it (given the same range for
Radar and ESM Receiver) the use of a lower sensitivity level;
and if the sensitivity of the ESM receiver is enhanced from
this value, a tremendous advantage in detection range is
achieved. The Radar and ESM parameters involved in the
following plots are:
Radar; Long Range Air Surveillance type,
Pt = 250 Kw. Transmitter Peak Power (Kw. )
Gt = 1585 Antenna Gain (mainlobe)
PW = A.O 10~ 6 s. Pulse Width
\ = 0.1 m Wavelength (meters)
Lt =2 Transmitter losses
g =1 Multipath factor
ht = 20 m Antenna height
ESM System:
Gesrr. - 1 ESM receiver Antenna Gain (Omni)
19






Power at ESM Receiver
ESM Sensitivity floor
Radar Sensitivity floor
Power at Radar Receiver
30 dBKm)
1000 Km.
Radar Maximum Bang* RANGE
Fig. 2 Radar and ESM receiver propagation, in dB, for a
particular radar.
The following step is to add more realistic data to
the comparison by introducing the radar range equation to the
effects of noise and the minimum signal to noise ratio
required. For a specified radar design, the most important
improvement is achieved if the SNR is set to the lowest
possible level, therefore, if the SNR is defined as the
independent variable of the equation, we can estimate the
radar detection range. In this analysis, the SNR (minimum)
of the radar is varied from 10 dB to 15.5 dB (10 to 35.5)
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radar detection range. In this analysis, the SNR (minimum)
of the radar is varied from 10 dB to 15.5 dB (10 to 35.5)
which are values commonly employed by radar designers.
As indicated in Figure 3, using a conservative
approach, the target has a 10 dB SNR at a maximum detection
range of about 200 Km. . This suggests why it is important to
gather basic data from a hostile emitter (peak power, antenna
size and gain, pulse width, frequency, etc. ), since it will
allow E.W. planners to estimate radar performance and counter












Fig. 3 Radar maximum detection range (R ) as function ofb rmax
minimum signal to noise ratio (SNR . )b mm
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detection range is set as a function of the sensitivity and
the sensitivity is varied over the range stated, the plot
shown in Figure 4 is obtained.
From Figure 4 it can be concluded that for Sensiti-
vities above -45 dBm, the ESM receiver performance is poor
since we know that the maximum detection range of the Radar
is about 200 Km. ; but as the sensitivity drops to -50 dBm or
below, the increment in ESM detection range increases rapidly.
The best weapon that airborne naval ESM survei 1 lance could
make use of is its detection range advantage. Therefore, no
receiver with sensitivities above -50 dBm will be considered
appropriate for the purposes of this thesis and that
automatically eliminates the use of CVRs for further
eva 1 ua i on.
Km.
700




(-105 dB; -75 dBm)
-7
3. 149 10 watts
(-65 dB; -35 dBm)
Fig 4. ESM performance in Range for detection
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D. GEOMETRICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In developing a tactical ESM mission, it is important to
ensure that flight altitude and detection range are defined
together. To determine this relationship, there are three
parameters to be considered:
a) First, given the emitter and aircraft altitudes, a
radar horizon exists that physically limits microwave
propagation. The following equation calculates the horizon
limited range, dependent on Earth's sphericity and atmospheric
refraction. This relationship is taken from [Ref. A]:
R,_ = 130.34hoz < hesm ) + ( ht
>*" (3-6)
where
ht = Radar height (in Km)
hesm = ESM receiver height (in Km)
b ) Second, we define a maximum ESM detection range




Pt -Gt -Gesm- \ - g*"
(4-n) -Smm Lt - Lesm
(3-7)
If the aircraft's altitude is too low, the radar horizon
becomes the limit for the maximum detection range.
2d
In order to optimize the capability for searching and
detecting, the flight height must be chosen such that the












7 . 67" 1
2 2 0.5
P t • Gt Gesm • \ • g
•( 4-TT
m i n
L t • L e s m
ht (Km )
This is a basis for later reference, and is simplified,
not taking into account other factors that affect the
performance of the system. This approach assumes the maximum
detection range as the principal factor of interest but most
of the time it is limited by the aircraft altitude (about
10 Km. )
.
As can be seen in the Figures 5 and 6 which plot the
height for the radar side and main lobe detection, the
altitudes required are relatively low for sensitivities above
-65 d B m (300 m . for- -65 dBm) against the side lobes, on the
other hand if the main lobe gain is considered in the
calculation, the height goes far above reasonable or
operationally realistic numbers (above 1000 Km. for -75 dBm.
and around 13 Km for -65 dBm).
_^
c) Finally a most important consideration is grazing
angle. If an aircraft is located at or below the tangential
line of sight defined by the radar horizon, the performance
of the radar emitter will be considerably degraded because of
the low grazing angle of the emission over the earth's
surface. This increases the sea clutter and diffraction
effects that can produce a lot of scattering and fading on the
radar signal during its propagation and reception. The use
of this tangential line will define what will be called the
ESM horizon slant range.
Km.
1000
f lgt m 1 n
-11
3. 16 10




(-80 dBw; -50 dBm)
Fig. 5 Flight height for Main lobe detection
Additionally because of the round trip requirement it
becomes very difficult for the Radar to perform in an
acceptable way under such conditions. On the other hand, the
25
ESM receiver is not seriously affected by this phenomena
because it will receive the direct ray without problems and
Km,
10




(-120 dB; -90 dBm)
-10
3. 16 10 watts
(-95 dB; -65 dBm)
Fig. 6 Flight height for side lobes detection
with a relatively high power level. Ideally it would be
preferred to always fly in this tangential approach. Then,
once detection has occurred while flying towards the emitter,
it must continuously lower its altitude trying to stay within
the radar worst detection zone the maximum possible time.
Within the scope of this thesis, the aircraft will be assumed
to be flying at constant speed and altitude, since the purpose
is to evaluate and analyze the variations of time and
reception performance parameters in a simulated environment.
However, further research should include the tangential flight
path combined with of other ESM requirements such as signal
26
to noise ratio, or time of coincidences, probability to
intercept vs. time, etc., to investigate additional
performance improvements.
In Figures 7 and 8 we see the theoretical conditions of
this tangential approach, which includes heights, ranges, main






Fig. 7 Electronic Horizon slant range.
We can conclude at this stage, that the performance of
an airborne ESM system initial ly depends on how far away it
is able to search, therefore the flight height must be
properly chosen in order to exploit the tangential
approximation the longest time possible. Lowering the range
improves the emitter side lobes interception by the ESM
receiver but the altitude must be adjusted so that the smaller
27
range, indicated from the sensitivity standpoint, is just at
the electronic horizon slant range. If the altitude is higher
at the time this side lobes detection is achieved, we might
well be inside the radar detection range in a region of
better radar reception, having lost the detectab i 1 i ty
advantage of the ESM/Elint aircraft.
A sensitive analysis, (Appendix J) using MATHCAD
demonstrated that the improvement of radar sidelobes detection
is not as important as the ability to obtain the maximum
information possible from the main lobe emission and this is










ESM Rx from main lobe
ESM Sensitivity floor








Fig. 8 Power availability at radar and ESM Rx. versus range
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For the model, depicted in Figure 7, which represents
a typical radar and an I FM receiver, detection of the
sidelobes (which are 32 dB below the main lobe), occurs at
ranges less than the radar maximum detection range. Perhaps
a more sensitive ESM receiver should be considered if sensing
the side lobes while avoiding radar detections is such a
desirable objective. An improvement is obtainable with their
higher sensitivity receivers, and it may be justifiable for
an ESM system designer to evaluate this capability
quantitatively.
E. PARAMETERS ACCURACY
The real accuracy of the ESM parameters of interest is
obtained by statistical analysis of sample measurements,




£ ( x . - x )
l (3-10)
where
n = Number of measurements taken
x = parameter Sample mean
x . = Sample data value
l
29
To improve the accuracy of the measurements, n should be
large ( n>30 ). The quality of the ESM receiver system can
be inferred if the difference term of the numerator is small
and if the parameter sample mean is close to the source
parameters
.
According to Wiley CRef. 2, p. 1353 the accuracy value,
required for an acceptable measurement, ranges from 0.1% to
1%, which is the ratio of the standard deviation to the actual
value of the parameter being measured. Ortiz [Ref. 9], and
Giaquinto [Ref. 10] in their respective works used accuracy
requirement values of 0.1% for frequency measurement and 1%
for both Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI) and Pulse Width (PW)
measurements. These were reasonably chosen and correspond
to values in commercially available receivers.
From Refs. 3, 4, 9, 10 and 12, the theoretical standard
deviation errors for frequency, PRI, and PW (as functions of
the Signal to Noise Ratio) for a Superhet receiver are





max = Ba (3-1 lj 3-12)
where Ba is the receiver acceptance bandwidth.
0. 35- (2) 0. 5
dPRI =








The formulas above described are derived from the
analysis done by Skolnik [Ref. 43 in chapter 11 of his book;
but after comparing the obtainable standard deviation errors
by using the formulas for frequency resolution, It was found
that they gave very different values which need to be
explained for application to an ESM receiver. These formulas
apply to matched receiver superhets. Normally the measurement
accuracy of a scanning (non-mathed) superhet is its bandwidth.
For example, a superhet tunable over a range (D) of one GHz.
and having an acceptance bandwidth (Ba) of one MHz. would have
a frequency resolution of 0.1% of its tuning range. If the
tuning range were, for example two to four GHz. ; then one
could have a 0.1% accuracy with a bandwidth of two MHz.
For I FM receivers, especial ly the digital types,
frequency resolution depends on the number of discriminators
or the least significant bit (LSB) of the mu 1 t i -d i scr im i nator
,
binary weighted, digital IFM.
Operational values for frequency accuracy in IFM
receivers achieved by the author have been around 6 to 7 MHz
and that is also mentioned as a standard frequency accuracy
by C. L. Davies in his article [Ref. 14, p. 165-1663 where
he talks about frequency measurements. In general terms then,
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the real accuracy should be, as stated initially, around 0.1
to 1% of the frequency value.
In wideband ESM receivers of the non-digital 1 FM type
such as CVR or wide band superhets -such as microscan
receivers- the noise bandwidth will be considerably less than
the RF bandwidth. A good approximation for Bn is:





In any case, frequency resolution is a matter of
bandwidth in tunable receivers. In IFMs it varies from very
poor (equal to Ba in CVR) to good (0.1%) for digital IFMs.
The last parameter to be considered is the Angle of
Arrival deviation, (dAOA). This is function of the kind of
direction finding receiver used by the system, and for the
purposes of this study it is assumed that this is an
independent Receiver. Actually due to the wide ESM
requirements in angle, power and frequency (and due to the
platform physical limitations), an AOA accuracy of 5 to 7
degrees is considered to be typical and operationally
reasonable [Ref. 143.
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IV. ESM MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The tactical objectives imposed on an ESM System are to
search for, intercept, locate and identify all the microwave
emissions expected to be found in the probable theater of
operations. If these are the requirements, a Measure of
Effectiveness (MOE) must reflect quantitatively (and to a
certain degree of accuracy), how we! 1 an ESM System is
achieving these objectives.
The Probability of Intercept (POI) as defined by Ortiz
and Giaquintc [Refs. 9 and 103 is a function cf three
independent factors: detectab i 1 i ty , coincidence and
identification. If reasonably good values are obtained for
these three factors, the system should be accomplishing the
tactical requirements, therefore POI appears to be a good ESM
system measure of effectiveness. The model for the POI is in
fact more realistic and complete than most of the definitions
found in manufacturers brochures or EW texts. It emphasizes
that all three conditions must be considered if a sensitive
analysis is needed and it is intrinsically suitable as a
decision tool. However, it is important to keep in mind that
the interception problem will not be solved by just having a
wide reception bandwidth, high sensitivity, and an omni
antenna; it is necessary to quantify the relationships and
csj
trade offs between them and then identify the improvable areas
within the ESM receiver.
The nature of the variables involved in this problem are
classified as controllable, uncontrollable (but predictable)
and random. They will be identified as the model is
developed with the fundamental purpose of highlighting their
influence on the final output and how an ESM designer can
overcome the induced handicaps by using his controllable
parame ter s
.
A. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
The first independent factor considered in the PO I model
is the probability of detection. It is modeled by Skolnik
[Ref. 4] and expanded for EW applications by Tsui [Ref. 3]
where the ratio of IF bandwidth to video bandwidth produces
a significant improvement, since the detector behaves as a
filter. The probability of detection is a function of the
signal power, receiver sensitivity, and the threshold level,
although it is important to note that the ESfi designer can
obtain improvements in all three factors by devoting attention
to the variables that are under his control.
The threshold level is obtained from:




$ = Noise voltage variance
Pfa = Probability of False Alarm
f 4-1 )
Generally, the probability of false alarm (Pfa) is set
to a reasonable value, and in this thesis it is set to 10
Additionally, the noise variance is set to 1 CRef. 3, p. 223.
The probability of detection set of formulas according
to Tsui [Ref. 3, Ch 21 is found in Appendices D and E of this
thesis for Superhet and I FM receivers respectively.
It should be noted that Tsui has introduced the ratio of
Br to Bv in the probability of detection equations, therefore
taking in to account what is ca 1 led as the "processing gain"
of the receiver. Many curves are shown in Tsui [Ref. 3,
Ch 2] where the overall probability of detection improvement,
due to the ratio Br/Bv ( r in the calculations), is
emphasized. The available signal power at the receiver, and
the receiver sensitivity, utilized in Tsui's equations were
analyzed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
B. PROBABILITY OF COINCIDENCE
The second independent factor of the PO I is the
probability of coincidence.
Before a detection can take place, the receiver must
first obtain an alignment of different parametric windows.
Self CRef. 15] developed a simple but effective model that
represents each parameter involved in the interception process
as pulse train functions of time. Each window function is
periodic, will have a window width (it will be of "squared"
shape), and the phase or starting time is assumed to be
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uniformly distributed. By using this model we can represent
any of the periodic window function involved in the problem
such as
:
- Antenna rotation and beamwidth,
- Radar pulse repetition interval and pulse width,
- Superhet time to scan and time on frequency band,
- Mean hopping time and pulse width, etc.
In this thesis the above four mentioned window functions
will be utilized for the analysis of the probability of
co i nc i dence
.
Since the window functions are periodic pulse trains,
their coincidences will also be periodic [Ref. 2, p. 50] and
will have the shape of a pulse train also. The coincidences















Period of the jth. window function
Width of the jth, window pulse
Computational formulas derived from the above are found
in Appendices H and 1 of this thesis for the desired windows.
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The probability of coincidence as function of time, Pc(t)
from Ref. 15 is expressed by:




K = 1 - Po (4-5)
The average coincidence fraction P is given by




The required values for T. and r. are defined as
3 3
f o 1 lows:
a) Antenna scan w i ndow : For the antenna scan window,
T. is the scan rate of the antenna in seconds (T ), and
3 3
t is the time the 3 dB beamwidth takes to illuminate any
a
ta r ge t , say
:
t = 9 3dB / [ 360° Scar rate C/sec) ] (4-7)
b. ) Rada r pulse train : The radar pulse train is by
itself a window function defined by its period PR1 and
Pulse Width (PW)
.
c. ) Super he t scan and t i me on f reguency : The sweep
period and acceptance bandwidth of a superhet receiver
must be carefully chosen because they not only affect the
probability of coincidence but also the noise level of
the system. The time the receiver dwe 1 Is on the
frequency band of the emitter, r , represents the window,
and to ensure interception, this time must be greater
than the pulse repetition interval.
Ortiz and Giaquinto CRefs. 9 and 10] have chosen T to
be 5 times the radar PR I for calculation purposes. The
time on frequency is defined by':
Ea + Bs/2
Ts = 5 PR I (4-8)
where for example:
Ba = 100 MHz; Receiver acceptance bandwidth
Bs = 250 KHz; Radar frequency spectrum app. 1/PW
D = 2 GHz: Sweep bandwidth of receiver
Ts = Scan time of receiver
From formula 4-7 we can calculate the values of:
Ts = 0.332 s. and t = 0.05 s; which were used in the























Fig. 9; Time to scan and time on frequency





The shortest time on frequency r is the minimum
time required by the detector for energy buildup, and is
inversely proportional to the acceptance bandwidth,
T ( mi n ) = 1 /Ba
.
Therefore if this value is replaced in equation
4-19, we will be able to obtain the fastest scan rate





Ba = 10 MHz/sec
and actually our sweep rate is
D 2 GHz
= 6000 MHz/sec (4-11
)
Ts 0.332 s.
Which confirms that, for our example, we are
scanning with a scan rate less than the maximum allowed.
d. ) Mean hopping t ime and pulse width : The last window
function of the model is derived from the fact that the
radar is hopping over five different frequencies,
therefore according to Self A. [Ref. 15] each frequency
can be treated as an individual radar. If the
frequencies are uniformly distributed, the period for a
particular frequency to be repeated on the average is
equal to five times the radar PR I , and since the time on
frequency of the superhet receiver covers up to five
times the PRI, it can intercept it. This problem must
be considered also for an IFM receiver since for
correlation purposes, the receiver needs to check the
hopping period. The window width on the average will
include two radar pulses since the receiver is dwelling
for a time equal to five times the radar PRI, and as
stated above, with this particular kind of hopping the
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mean time for any particular frequency to appear again
is five times the PR I .
C. PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION
The identification of a radar emitter is done by
comparing the received parameters with those stored in an
internal library. Assuming that the stored parameters were
accurately obtained and recorded, the probability of
identification is a function of the quality of the receiver
measurements, the number of parameters obtained, the
characteristics of the processor and the electromagnetic
density of the environment. Since in this thesis we are
assuming a low intensity kind of encounter, we can assume that
the processor will be able to handle appropriately all the
information obtained by the receiver subsystem. The last
assumption made the identification problem a direct function
of the Receiver measurement accuracy/resolution, and the
number of parameters measured.
From information theory we can state that in order to
reduce uncertainty, any decision must be made over as many
dimensions as there are available from the information source.
This is particularly true in EW since it is required to sort
classify and identify the signals intercepted; and all modern
radar transmitters try to randomize their parameters in order
to complicate the evaluation process at E S M reception.
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Davies C. L. CRef. 15, p. 166] stated that the major
parameters required for characterizing an emission are: angle
of arrival, carrier frequency, pulse repetition interval (PR1)
and pulse width (PW); and the availability and accuracy of
them improves the identification capability of the System.
From the parameters cited Angle of Arrival (AOA) is the most
important since, while the other parameters may be varied by
the transmitter, it is impossible to mask its AOA. The
remaining parameters, arranged in order of importance, are
frequency, PRI and PW.
The parameters availability can be modeled by using
normally distributed accuracy formulas corrected to obtain
realistic performance that is within 0.1 to 1% of the original
parameter. Using one standard deviation (± 1 a) as
descriptor of variability gives a probability of occurrence
of only 68.27 %. If we use two standard deviations (± 2 a )
,
then the probability of occurrence raises to 95.44%
Accuracy and resolution are two closely related terms.
Resolution is the finest resolving power of the system that
will allow for differentiation of two signals closely spaced
in the parameter spectrum. On the other hand, accuracy of the
measurements depends on many factors but its minimum value is
defined by the resolution of the system. It is important to
state that a system cannot measure more accurately than its
resolving capability, but signal variations that produce
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inaccuracies may well affect a parameter measurement if they
are significant; that is bigger than the resolution cell.
For the case of frequency measurements, the superhet and
I FM resolution problems are different. In the first case, the
resolution is defined by the IF bandwidth of the system, while
in most modern IFM systems it is given by the least
significant bit of the digital parameter word.
For the model of this thesis, is assumed an 10 bit
frequency word in the IFM system which makes the frequency
resolution to be approximately 2 MHz. out of a 2 GHz.
frequency band.
The accuracy measurement formulas derived from chapter
three of this work arid corrected for general EW application






Frequency identification occurs with a high probability
if ( 4 - a - F ) / f is < 0.001; and if the frequency resolution is
c
also within that limit (0.001 of the original frequency).
0. 35
cjPR
0.8 E - SNR
v
(4-13)







PW identification occurs if (4-<r-PW)/PW < 0.01
The probability of identification can be modeled from
combinatorial analysis and using the utility factors approach
recommended by Glenn [Ref. 7]. Therefore we will be able to
weight properly each of the possible combinations of the
parameters at reception according to the importance of each
of them and make use of MATHCAD's MAX function to select the
most valuable combination. The utility factors of the
parameters at reception are:




wl = 0. 3
w2 = 0. 28
w3 = 0. 25
w4 = 0. 19
A sensitivity analysis was applied to these utility
factors in order to check their influence in the
identification process. This will be discussed in the next
chapter during the analysis of the output.
When a parameter is measured, and its deviation is within
the required limits, then we will be able to use it.
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This is modeled by using MATHCAD's Heaviside's step
f unct i on
:
d(x) = $ (limit - (4<t/jj)) (4-15)
Therefore if the ratio, deviation/mean, is less than the
required limit a "1" is returned, otherwise it will return a
"0". Finally, with the use of combinatorial analysis, an
identification array is modeled that includes all the
available parameter combinations at reception that may
identify a certain transmitter, weighting each particular
combination according to which parameters it is composed of,
and using the standard deviation model to determine which
parameters were available at every measurement. In this way,
the combinations are arranged from top to bottom with the most
valuable at the top and the least at the bottom. The
weighting factor used in every row (combination), was chosen
to be the square root of the summation of the weights of the
respective parameters involved. The usage of this array
guaranteed that only the row which included all the available
measurements will be selected, avoiding redundant choices.
This is true because, for example, if three parameters are
identified, all combinations will acquire a certain value but
only the one which includes al 1 three must have been selected.
Initially the weighting factors were defined just by the sum
cf the weights of the respective deviations within each
combination; but this approach was discovered to overweigh the
combinations which had more elements (or more weight).
Therefore when only two or three parameters were identified
the probability of identification was decided not by the
combination which contained the identified parameters but by
the more valuable combination (the one which includes
measurements of all the parameters) even though it did not
have all the deviations identified. This was because the
weights overcame the lack of parameters. It is clear then
that the model was not correct, since even though it included
al 1 the variables of the problem, it always selected the same
combination (the one with the highest weighting factor).
(wl+w2 + w3 + w4l 5 -0.25 ( d A0A + dF + dPR I + dPW )
(wl+w2+w3)' -0.333 ( d A0A+ dF+ dPR I
)
5(wl+w2+w4) w -0.333 ( dAOA+dF+dPW
)
5(wl+w3+w4) -0.333 ( dAOA+dPR 1 +dPW
)
(w2+w3+w4)' -0.333 ( dF+dPR I + dPW
5(wl+w2>" -0.5 (dAOA+dF)
(wl+w3)' -0.5 (dAOA+dPRI) (4-16)
.5(wl+w4) -0.5 (dAOA+dPW)










The weight differences from row to row were also too
significant. As a result, weight difference became the key
in the selection process even though in some cases there was
a lack of other information.
In order- to solve this problem, the differences between
the rows of the array created in the original model were
reduced by taking their square root. Then by using MATHCAD's
MAX function, we were able to chose the combination which had
the highest value in the probability of identification array.
The following example illustrates the weighting factors
problem. Suppose that the system has identified frequency,
PRI, and PW, and MATHCAD'S MAX function is used. Then:
dAOA = 0; dF = 1; dPR I = 1; dPW = 1
a) Method No
.
1.: Weight = Sum of weights
1.0 (0.25) (dAOA+dF+dPRI +dPW) = .75 . . wrong selection
0.9 (0.33) (dAOA + dF + dPR I ) = .594
0.7 (0.33) (dAOA+dPRI +dPW) = .462
0.6 (0.33) (dF+dPRl +dPW) = 0.6
. 5
b) Method No .
2
: Weight = (Sum of weights)
1.0 (0.25) (dAOA+dF+dPRI +dPW) = .75
0.948 (0.33) (dAOA+dF+dPRI ) = .626
0.637 (0.33) (dAOA + dPR! +dPW = .557
0.774 (0.33) ( dF+dPR 1 +dPW) = .774 . . right selection
47
Therefore by using MATHCAD' s MAX function in method No.
2
the correct selection was made.
Parameters Measured
PROBABILITY OF
IDENTIFICATION P(id)AOA FREQ PRI PW
X X X X 1. 00
X X X 0.911
X X X 0. 877
X X X 0.86
X X X 0.85
X X 0.761
X X 0.741
X X . 7






Table 1'. Probability of Identification based on combinatorial
analysis, weighting factors, and parameter accuracies.
The combination that matched the parameters identified
was weighted the most valuable compared with the other
possible combinations within the array.
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The angle of arrival identification was particularly
difficult to model because it depends on the direction finding
(DF) receiver system employed. Consequently, in order to
solve it we established an AOA rms. error of 4 degrees as a
reference and -50 dBm as its sensitivity level. These are
typical values of performance by equipment used for tactical
purposes. General ly, most ESM systems have a separate DF
receiving system that is interfaced with the radio frequency
system. The most common DF system uses amplitude comparison
techniques and its receivers are broadband crystal video
in an omn i -d i rect i ona 1 array of 4, 6 or 8 antennas.
The DF accuracy obtained in the model will be a function
then of the strength of the signal at reception, the
sensitivity level, and the ratio between the actual angular
error of the system compared with the stated reference. The
actual rms error was set to 5 degrees.
As documented in this chapter, the PO I is a function of
three independent factors, probability of detection,
probability of coincidence, and probability of identification.
Each one of these factors being particularly defined, the
measure of effectiveness reflects the complex interaction of
the many inputs involved, and allows the designer to




In the analysis section of this thesis we will go over
the outputs of the different MATHCAD files which were
developed in order to represent the POI as explained in
chapter four. The causes and effects related to each
particular set of curves will be discussed. The generated
cur ves are:
- Main lobe and side lobes probability of detection
- Main lobe and side lobes probability of coincidence
- Main lobe and side lobes probability of identification
- Main lobe and side lobes probability of intercept
The curves were modeled from both I FM and superhet
receiver special characteristics, as defined in appendices B
and C. The aircraft was initially placed at 4000 m. height,
(279 Km. maximum range) on the ESM horizon line (tangential
to the Earth), beyond the estimated radar maximum range, which
will allow us to observe typical performances.
A. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION ANALYSIS
The analysis starts with the probability of detection
curves Figures 9, 10 and 11. Figure 9 shows the probability
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of detection of the radar's sidelobes as a function of time
for a superhet receiver. Each time unit represents 200
seconds of flight. Therefore after flying BOO sec. (app. at
200 km. from the target), this receiver will act as an
omnidirectional antenna by receiving the radar all the time.
It should be noted that the probability of detection for the
r^d^r main lobe, as expected, was always unity across the time
window of interest. The equations used from Tsui [Ref . 3, Ch.
2], which include the processing gain effect due to the ratio
Br/Bv, actually reduce the SNR required at the receiver to
obtain a certain probability of detection given a probability
oi false alarm. In fact, the required SNR to produce a 0.977
probability of detection is approximately 1 dB., when the


















F l g . 7 Radar side lobes probabio 1 i t 1 y of detection vs. time
superhet receiver case.
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The probability of detection versus time, for the example
I FM receiver, showed that: due to the rms. noise power
increase (wider bandwidth), this receiver was unable to detect
the radar sidelobes during all the flight time. Near the end
of the time line (62 Km. from target) the SNR for the radar
side lobes was just 0.88 dB; too low for achieving detection,
and this agrees with the curves from Tsui [Ref. 3, Ch. 2].
In any case, as Figure 11 shows, it did detect the radar









2? 9 »<m. 6 o Km.
Fig. 10 Radar main lobe probability of detection vs. time;
superhet receiver case.
The analysis of the probability of detection factors
showed that the superhet receiver had the advantage of having
detection of both the radar main and side lobes. On the other
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hand the IFM receiver was able to detect the r^d^r emission








79 Km. 62 K IT) .
Fig. 11 Radar main lobe probability of detection vs. time;
IFM receiver case.
B. PRUBABILI1Y fJF CL) INCIDENCE ANALYSIS
The probability of coincidence vs. time in the superhet
receiver wa = very low as can be observed in Figure 12, where
after 2200 seconds of flight the probability of coincidence
is 0.06. This is the disadvantage of using a narrowband
scanning receiver against a frequency hopping r^dor.
From the respective NATHCAP file, the average time
between coincidences (period) from a superhet receiver for the
>
main lobe and sidelobee was found to be 8 h. 50 min. 30 sec,

























Fig. 13 Superhet receiver side lobes probability of
coincidence versus time.
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The low performance induced by increasing the number of
window functions is drastic, which explains why modern radar
designs are trying to randomize (within limits) most of the
transmitted parameters.
One way to improve the probability of coincidence is by
elimination of one window function or optimization of the
window functions that are under our control; the first
solution is possible if IFM receivers are used. IFM receivers
can observe instantaneously, wider bandwidths eliminating the
receiver-scan window function (setting it equal to one). This
effect is shown in Figures 14 and 15, for main and side lobes






Fig. 14 IFM receiver main lobe probability of coincidence
versus time.
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In Figure 15 a 0.9 probability of coincidence (mainlobe)
at the end of the time window of interest is achieved; and in
Figure 16 it can be seen that the probability of coincidence
approaches unity very fast, which is a tremendous improvement














Fig. 15 IF 11 receiver side lobes probability of coincidence
versus time.
In general it can be said that the probability of
coincidence curves gave the IFM receiver a significant
preformance advantage when compared with the superhet receiver
performance against both the radar main and side lobes.
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C. PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS
The probability of identification is quite empirical
since, even though the accuracy of the measurements relates
to identification of parameters, these formulas were evaluated
with assumed errors which try to mimic realistic ESM
scena rios.
For the case of superhet receiver, it can be observed in
Figure 16 that for main lobe reception, the probability of
identification has a value of 0.78 during all the time of
interest. This is explained because the model is identifying
all the parameters except frequency (wider resolution).
Additional ly AOA, which was set to be the ratio of a reference
value to the actual accuracy, had an accuracy of 0.8 (4/5
= 0.8); therefore, the identification array chose the fourth
combination giving us a probability of identification of 0.79.
For the superhet side lobes case, the probability of
identification has a value of 0.48 from t = s. to 1450 s.
where it jumps to 0.663. The first value is due to PR I
measurement alone. and after closing in range for 1450 s. the
system is able to identify additionally the emitter PW, thus
improving its identification contribution.
For an I FM receiver, the mainlobe identification problem
is depicted in Figure 17, where (at t = 1320 s. ) the
probability of identification jumps from 0.84 to 0.95. This
jump is due to PW accuracy improvement at that particular
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Fig. 18 I FM Main lobe probability of identification vs. time
Figure 19 plots the side lobes case of the same problem.
In here we find a straight line, representing a constant
probability of Identification value of 0.728. This value
comes from having achieved only PRI and frequency accuracy,
no other parameter was available during the time window.
The probability of identification plots have shown an
considerable advantage of the 1FM on main and side lobes
emitter identification. The main source of this difference
is due to the frequency identification capability of the I FM
receiver (fine frequency resolution). Frequency availability









9 Km. 62 K m
.
Fig. 19 IFM side lobes prob. of identification vs. time.
D. POI ANALYSIS
Finally all the above probabilities are used to model the
overall probability of intercept (POI), this may be expressed
as A function of two mutual ly exclusive events:
POI POIml + POIsl - (POIml -POIsl ) (5-1 )
where
:
POIml = Probability of intercept main lobe
POIsl = Probability of intercept side lobes
Each one of the above variables are derived from three
mutually independent events:
60
POIml = PDm] PIDml PCm
1




PDml - Probability of detection - main lobe -
PDs! = Probability of detection - side lobes -
PIDml = Probability of identification - main lobe
PIDsl = Probability of identification - side lobes
PC ml - Probability of coincidence - main lobe -
PC si = Probability of coincidence - side lobes -
The above data was generated for every time step within
each of MATHCAD file. The outputs were also stored in the
form of files in such a way that the P01 file recovered the
component fiies, did the calculations above explained, and
outputed the PO! results. The plot shown in Figure 19
represents the overall probability of intercept for both 1FM
and superhet receivers in this particular scenario.
The most significant aspect about Figure 20 is that the
I FM performance did not make use of any Side lobe interception
since it was never able to detect it. In addition, the
performance of the superhet receiver was not as good as that
of the I FM even though it achieved very good detection (SNR)
and identification (theoretical from SNR) of main and side
lobes along the time line. From this we can deduce that
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Fig. 20 Probability of intercept versus time, superhet and
IFM receivers performance.
in these scenarios and, as has been discussed in many
publications, it represents a key point for superhet receivers
which suffer the larger degradation in their interception
capabilities. In order to investigate this further, it was
decided to test the model against the same radar but while
transmitting a constant carrier frequency. The probability
of intercept plot obtained is in Figure 21.
This confirms the influence of the probability of
coincidence in the general performance. By fixing the carrier
frequency, one eliminates one of the window functions, thereby




























Fig. 21 Probability of intercept vs. time, superhet and IFM
performances against a fixed frequency radar.
receiver performs better until a PP . t = 1300 s. because the
additional weighting of having both main and side lobes
interception supplies a significant increase in POI. This
overcomes the additional window function that the Superhet was
encountering (scanning in frequency).
Both curves show a "jump" approximately between t = 1300
and 1450 s. This is derived from the PW identification, as
exp 1 ai ned above
.
In general terms, when dealing against a fixed frequency
radar, the superhet receiver experiments a considerable
improvement. This improvement is basically due to better
probability of coincidence performance, and if frequency
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resolution is refined by the use of a narrower band, better
identification values can be obtained.
E. SENSITIVE ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTING FACTORS
Final ly, the weighting factors were tested in order to
check their influence in the probability of identification and
in the probability of intercept. The weighting factors as









dAOA =0.4 0. 35 0. 35
d F =0.3 0. 35 0. 3
dPRI = 0.2 . 2 5 0, 2
d P W = 0.1 . 5 . 1 5
Table 2. Weighting factors sets.
As can be seen in Figure 21, the use of the first set of
weights does not affect the initial probability of intercept
(Figure 19) except by a small reduction in the superhet
receiver. The performance is otherwise nearly the same as for
Figure 20. Reviewing the probability of identification plots
it was found that the side lobes jump at t = 1450 s. changed
initially from 0.479 to 0.648 (Figure 16) but in Figure 21
they changed from 0.447 to 0.557. For the I FM esse the
variations were not significant.
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Fig. 22 Superhet and IFM performances; dAOA = 0.4, dF = 0.3,
dPRI = O. 2, and dPW =0.1
Following the a-set weights evaluation, b-set weights
were substituted and the plot of Figure 22 was obtained. It
can be noted a significant decrease in the probability of
intercept curves, and especial ly in the superhet curves, as
compared with Figure 20; but if they are compared with Figure
22 it can be found after the jump both Figures show no
difference. One observes an approximate 0.2 improvement, in
the superhet receiver, before the jump takes place. With the




















Fig. 23 Superhet and IFM performances; dAOA = 0.35,






























Fig. 24 Superhet and IFM performances; dAOA = 0.35, dF = 0.3,
dPRI = 0. 2, dPW = 0. 15.
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The only difference is that the jump in the superhet PO
I
is larger with set c. This is because PW is now weighted more
hea v i 1 y
.
The precedence used in this work for the parameters
weighting should be kept unless extremely good processor
performances would allow the use of higher utility factors
consequently modifying the established precedence. It would
be desirable also to test operationally for the values of each
parameter with special consideration of the processor
capab i 1 i t i es
.
As can be observed in the plots, the shape of the POI
curves would not be altered but their time to achieve a POI
value could be reduced with variations in the weighting
factors. In any case, the approach used in this thesis is




During ES!i systems performance evaluation many
/ariables and complex trade off s between them, must be
considered. The model used in this work is robust and expands
qualitative evaluations commonly done with a "good",
'" a .i . p-: -.- - icy .
vs j. \ he scope ana scenarios of this thesis it can
ded J r the m< asure of effectiveness, that the IFM
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we 1 - that superhet receivers sre capable of achieving
frequency accurac> as compared with IFM receivers,
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.
Sensitivity still remains a very important parameter
ce signal value is critical at aver/ step in the
ca I cu 1 at.ions .
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pec time, whi three- rada ere more
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I wartime tactical operations, the IFM is superior
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t ' - - .
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below th ins sn f the i Ltterwhicl"
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s
-65 dEn . or better are considerably greater the:
imun radar detection ranee.
the
VII. RECOMENDATIONS
1 ' perational test should be conducted to compare and
validatethe dota presented here. The combina tor
i
a 1 -weight ing
factors approach presented appeared to give artificially high
accuracy values.
Z tine oeace time operations; E3 :- ' a. - : crews
; their ef 3rt= I Dward fine tuning radar
order to upgrade c eni threat libraries.
APPENDIX A: SENSITIVITY REQUIREMENTS
SENSITIVITY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ESM RECEIVER
The required sensitivity is a function of the enemy radar and
of the operational requirements imposed such as detection range
or pulse density.
Enemy radar parameters:






r : = 4 1 s
Antenna Gain (app. 32 db)
Pu 1 se width
X : = . 1 m Wavelength (in meters)
S band radar






Radar antenna height (m)
ESM parameters:
G : = 1
esm
Omnidirectional Antenna




h : = 1000
esm
ESM aircraft height (m)
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1.- ESM AND RADAR SENSITIVITY REQUIREMENTS AS FUNCTION OF RANGE
R : = 1,5 . . 1000
Signal power at Radar receiver :
2 2 4
P G rr-X g
t t
S (R) := 10 log
t 3





P G cr X g
t t
3 4





Signal power at ESM receiver (in dBw):
r
2
4 tt G • (1000 R)
esm
S (R) := 10 log'
esm












Power at ESM receiver vs. Range
800 Km.





































Radar and ESM Power at reception comparison vs. Range (log
scale) for the prescribed conditions (a = 20 m2).
No i se f 1 oor k T Bn Fn
ESM noise floor app. -98 dBw for an 1 FM
Radar noise floor app. -125 dBw (typical)
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RADAR AND ESM MAXIMUM DET. RANGES AS FUNCTION OF SENSITIVITY
a.- Radar maximum detection range
-23
k := 1.38 10
To : = 290
1





SNR : = 10, 10.
5
m i n
35. 5 Minimum SNR reqd. for
detection (10 to 15 dB)
F := 4 Noise Figure (6 dB)
.25
R TSNR
rma x j m i n
2 2 4
P G A • * ' g
t t
(4 tt> k To B F SNR









10 dB 15.5 dB
Radar maximum detection range as function of SNR
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b.- ESM receiver maximum detection range (this is minimum
signal required above the noise floor to in order to generate a
detect i on
.
Sensitivity rsmge -105 to -65 dBw (-75 to -35 dBm)
-11 -10 -7




P G G X
t t esm
esm mi n
(4 tt) S L L





esm m l n
100
-11 S
3. 162 10 min
(-105 dB; -75 dBm)
3. 149 10 watts
(-65 dB; -35 dBm)
ESM performance in range for detection of a radar main lobe as a
function of various sensitivity levels.
2.- FLIGHT HEIGHT (ESM Rmax = Radar Horizon)






ESM aircraft heigth (Km)
Sensitivity range, -105 dBw (-75 dBm) to -75 dBw (-45 dBm)
-11 -11 -8
S := 3.16 10 ,9.9 10 ..3.16 10
min
Radar Horizon (Km) equation:
.5 . 5
|
R := 130.34 fh + [h
Hz [_[_ esmKm tKm
Then the height in Kilometers will be found from
h [s
f 1 g t min
-6
7.672 10
P G G X
t t esm













(-80 dBw; -50 dBm)
Flight height (in Km) for detecting the Radar's main lobe
(Gt = 1585) vs. various Sensitivity levels.
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For side lobes detection, (Gt = 0.5)
-12 -12 -10
S := 1 10 ,2 10 ..3.16227 10
m i n
f 1 g t2 |_ mi n
-6
7.672 10
P 0. 5 G *
t esm
(4 tt) S L L




f lgt2 i n
. 2
-12 S
10 m i n
(-120 dB; -90 dBm)
-10
3.16 10 watts
(-95 dB; -65 dBm)
Flight height (in Km.) for detecting the Radar's sidelobes
(Gt = 0.5) vs. various sensitivity levels
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APPENDIX B: SETUP (SUPERHET)
Superhet Receiver case
In this file the user must state the required parameters for
both the ESM receiver and the enemy Radar to be encountered.
The follow on calculations will automatically update their
output every time a change is made.
SHIPBORNE ENEMY RADAR (AIR SURVEILLANCE)
hr := 20 Enemy radar height (m)
Pt := 250000 Peak power (watts)
9
ft := 3 10 Center frequency (Hz)
8
3 10
Xt := Transmitter wavelength
ft
Gtml := 1585 Gain Radar Main Lobe ( 32 dB)
Gtsl := .5 Gain Radar Side lobe ( -3 dB)
PRF := 300 Pulse Repetition Frequency (Hz)
1
PRI := Pulse Repetition Interval
PRF
-6
PW := 4 10 Pulse width (sec)
Lt := 3 Radar transmission losses
g := 1 Multipath factor < g~2 < A
RPM := 6 Antenna Scan Rate
63dB := 2.5 Antenna 3dB Beamwidth
60






Time Antenna's Main Lobe Points
in a particular direction
ESM RECEIVER PARAMETERS
Vmph := 220
Vm := Vmph . 447
hesm := 4000
9
FL := 2.0 10
9
FU := 4.0 10
D : = FU - FL
6
Br : = 50 10
6
Bv := 10 10
6
Ba : = 50 10
Br
Bv










Gesm : = 1
Pfa := 1 10
-11
ESM platform speed (knots)
ESM platform speed (m/seo)
Height of ESM platform (m)
Minimum Frequency (Hz)
Upper Frequency (Hz)




Ratio of Br to Bv
Integration efficiency coeff.
Processing Gain
Receiver Noise Figure (in dB)
Receiver Noise Figure
ESM Antenna Gain
Probability of False Alarm
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Time to scan Frequency band
( sec . )
Time a particular frequency
remains in the Receiver Passband
Minimum coincidence duration
Time increment (sec)
I ncremen t limit
Esm and Radar input parameters are written into output files
called ESM and RADAR respectively.

















































APPENDIX C: SETUP ( I FM )
I FM based ESM Receiver case
In this file the user must state the required parameters for
both the I FM based ESM receiver and the enemy Radar to be
encountered. The follow on calculations will automatically
update their output every time a change is made.
SHIPBORNE ENEMY RADAR (AIR SURVEILLANCE)




Gain Radar Main Lobe (app 32 dB
)
Gain Radar Side lobe (app -3 dB
Pulse Repetition Frequency (Hz)
Pulse Repetition Interval
Pu 1 se w i d,t h ( sec )
Radar transmission losses




hr : i 20

















Lt : = 3
g ! = 1
RPM = 6








Period of Antenna Scan
Time Antenna's Main Lobe Points
in a particular direction
ESM RECEIVER PARAMETERS
Vmph := 220
Vm := Vmph .447
hesm := 4000
9
FL := 2.0 10
9
FU := 4.0 10
D := FU - FL
6
Br := 2000 10
6
Bv := 10 10
6













ESM platform speed (knots)
ESM platform speed (m/sec)
Height of ESM platform (m)
Minimum Frequency (Hz)
Upper Frequency (Hz)




Ratio of Br to Bv
Integration efficiency coefficient
Processing Gain
Receiver Noise Figure (in dB)
Receiver Noise Figure
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Gesm : = 1
Pfa : = 110




T : = 10
tf := 220
11
ESM Antenna Gain (Omni)





Esm and Radar input parameters are written into output files called












































WR1TEPRN [Radar ~| := Radar
L P rn J *
WRITEPRN [ESMif m := ESMifm
L P rn J J
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APPENDIX D: PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (SUPERHET)
Superhet Receiver case
This file calcutates the probability of- detection for a
general ESM System based on the theory explained in Tsui's
book [Ref. 3], that is, considering the effects of the ratio Br
to Bv.
Radar := READPRN [Radar
L Pm j








X : = Radar
3
Gtm 1 : = Radar
G ts 1 : = Rada r
PRF := Radar
6










ra : = Radar
12





















r : = ESM
9
gamma : = ESM
10

























ae := 8493.3 10
t := 0,1 . . tf
tl := T •
t
t
Rl := ae + hr








Maximum Range (Radar Horizon)




9rad : = acos
2 2 2




















SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO CALCULATIONS














N := k To Br FN Receiver Noise Power
(d-7)
Main Lobe Signal to Noise
Rat io
:
(at output of detector)
(d-8)
Side Lobe Signal to Noise
Ratio:
(at output of detector)
(d-9)
2 2
Gtm 1 Pt Gesm X g
SNRml
4 ttR N Lt Lesm
SNRsl := SNRml
t t
G t s r
Gtml
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATIONS
MAIN LOBE SIDE LOBE
Kim := 1 + SNRml (d-10)
t t


























1 + 3 SNRs
1





































































































Bs : = Ys + - - - erf




Cm := -Ym + Xm + - erf










Cs := -Ys + Xs + - erf




























Pdm : = Pdlm 5 T.
t t |_





Pds := Pdls 5 |.5
t t
Is + Pd2s 5 [Pd2s -
.5]
tj t L t J
(d-35)
The values for the Probability of Detection vs. time are written
into output files.






APPENDIX E; PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (IFM)
I FM based Receiver case
This file calcutates the probability of detection for a
general ESM System based on the theory explained in Tsui's book,
that is, considering the effects of the ratio Br to Bv.
Radar := READPRN [Radar
L Pm .
ESMifm := READPRN ESMi fm
prn
RADAR PARAMETERS





X : = Radar
3
Gtml := Radar







g : = Rada r
9
83dB := Radar




















































ae : = 8493. 3 10
t : = 0,1 . . tf
tl := T t
t
Rl := ae + hr










Maximum Range (Radar Horizon)




trad : = acos
2 2 2




















SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO CALCULATIONS
23













k To Br FN (e-6)
Main Lobe Signal to Noise
Rat i o
(at output of detector):
Side Lobe Signal to Noise
Rat i o




Gtm 1 Pt Gesm X g
SNRm
4 tt R N Lt Lesm
Gtsl
SNRs 1 : = SNRm I I
t t JGtml
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PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATIONS
MAIN LOBE SIDE LOBE
Kim := 1 + SNRml (e-9)
t t






















Ma i n 1 obe ( e- 1 1
)
Side 1 obes ( e-12)
K3m
2 + 3
1 + 3 SNRml








2 + 3 —
4
1 + 3 SNRs
1
Side 1 obes ( e-14
)








































Ma i n 1 obe
:







• 1 exp ma x
t t 2
























































L \2 J J
Ma in lobe (e-25)

















































Main lobe probability of detection ( I FM System):
PdmlFM := Pdlm • 5 I . 5 - Pdlm + Pd2m I |Pd2m - .5
t t L tj t L t
(e-33)
Side lobes probability of detection ( I FM System):
PdsIFM := Pdls 5|.5 - Pdls + Pd2s I Pd2s - .5
t t tj t t
(e-34)
100
The probability of detection vs. time is written into an output
file:
WRITEPRN |PdgmIFM := PdmlFM Main lobe
L Pm J t
WRITEPRN iPdgsIFM
pr n
= PdsIFM Side lobes
t
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APPENDIX F: PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION (SUPERHET)
Superhet Receiver case
This file calcutates the probability of identification as a
function of time Pi(t) for a Superhet ESM System based on the
percent error deviations of the input signal in angle of
arrival, frequency, pulse repetition interval, and pulse width.
It reads the Radar and ESM parametrers from the Radar/ESM
parameter file and creates plots of Pi(t) of both the emitter
side lobes and main lobe. The file writes Pi(t) data into an
output file for the final POI(t) calculations.
Radar := READPRN Radar
prn
ESM := READPRN ESM
prn
RADAR PARAMETERS
hr : = Radar
Pt := Radar
ft : = Radar
Rada r
G tm 1 : = Radar








Ta : = Radar
11




















Ba : = ESM
8
l~ : = ESM
9
gamma : = ESM
10


























t : = 0,1 . . tf
tl : = T t
t
Rl := ae + hr










Maximum Range (Radar Horizon)




trad : = acos
2 2 2




h : = Vm






2 Rl R2 cos [tlrad - 6 1
L I. t j j
(f-A)
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SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO CALCULATIONS
23
k := 1. 38 10
To : = 290
Boltzman's constant











N : = k To B FN
ef f
(f-6)
Main Lobe Signal to Noise
Ratio




Gtm 1 Pt Gesm X g
A tt R N Lt Lesm
Side Lobe Signal to Noise
Ratio
(at output of detector)
( f -8)
[Gts I
SNRsl := SNRml i
t t |_Gtml





Gtm 1 Pt Gesm X g
t 2
| A it R Lt Lesm
L ^ j





S m 1 ! |
t [G t m 1 J
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PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION CALCULATIONS
Frequency error (Main lobe and Side lobes)















Pulse Repetition interval error (Main lobe and Side lobes)
dPRIm : = 1
t























dPWs := a .01 -
Bv SNRs 1
L L PU 1 <f -16)
Angle Of Arrival error
Hrms : = 5
'ret' := 4
Smin := 1 . 10
AOA
Actual rms angular accuracy
( de gr ees
)
Angular accuracy of reference
(degrees)
Minimum discernible signal
















Each combination is properly weigthed according to the
quality of its components. The first coefficient is justified
since each parameter has a relative importance, and therefore it
defines the overall weight for each combination:
dAOA = 0. 3
dF = 0. 28
dPRI = 0. 23
dPW = 0. 19
And the second coefficient of each element of the matrix
comes from the need to measure relative to a maximum value of i
each of the combinations. Then if we just have obtained
measurements from two or three parameters, only one combination
will be se 1 ected
.
wl ; = 0. 3
w2 : = 0. 28
w3 : = 0. 23
wA . = 19
Weight corresponding to AOA error
Weight corresponding to freq. error-
Weight corresponding to PR1 error
Weight corresponding to PW error
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Main lobe probability of identification matrix ( f -19)
1 [~0. 25- [dAOAm + dFm + dPRIm + dPWm "T
tJJ
wl + w2 + w3 0. 333 [dAOAm + dFm + dPRIm 11
•]wl + w2 + w4 fb.333 [dAOAm + dFm + dPWm
I I t t t'l
•jwl + w3 + w4 [b.333 [dAOAm + dPRIm + dPWm
L L t t tjj
w2 + w3 + w4
Pirn : = max 1
O. 3333 [dFm + dPRIm + dPWm
L t t tJJ
wl + w2 [6.5 [dAOAm + dFm
L L t tJJ
[dAOAm +
t
\| w 1 + w 3
jwl + w4
0. 5 dPRIm
0.5 [dAOAm + dPUm
L t tjj
•|w2 + w3 • lb. 5 rdFm + dPRIm
t tj
Jw2 + w4 [6.5
L
•J










Side lobes probability of identification matrix (f -20)
1 !~0. 25 [dAOAs + dFs + dPRIs + dPWs "11
I. L t t t t_|J
Pis ma x
wl + w2 + w3
wl + w2 + w4
•Jwl + w3 + w
w2 + w3 + w4




AOAs + dFs + dPWs
t t tj_
fdAOAs + dPRI s + dPWs
L t t t_|_
0.3333 dFs + dPRIs + dPWs
••^wl + w2 0.5
•^wl + w3 0.5
•jwl + wA JO.










w2 + v/4 0. 5 |dFs + dPWs
t t














APPENDIX G; PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION ( I FM )
IFM based Receiver case
This file calcutates the probability of identification as a
function of time Pi(t) for an IFM - ESM System based on the
percent error deviations of the input signal in angle of
arrival, frequency, pulse repetition interval, and pulse width.
It reads the Radar and ESM parametrers from the Radar/ESM
parameter file and creates plots of Pi(t) of both the emitter
sidelobes and mainlobe. The file writes Pi(t) data into an
output file for POI(t) calculations.
Radar := READPRN [Radar
L Pm J
ESMifm := READPRN [ESM i f m
L Pm
RADAR PARAMETERS
hr : = Radar
Pt := Radar
ft := Radar
X : = Radar
Gtm 1 : = Radar
Gtsl := Radar
PRF : = Radar
PRI := Radar
PW := Radar
g : = Radar
^3dB : = Radar
10
112
Ta : = Radar
11
ra : = Radar
12














































ae : = 8493. 3 10
t : = 0,1 . . tf
1 1 : = T t
t
Rl := ae + hr









Maximum Range (Radar Horizon)
3






Hrad : = acos
2 2^^ ^ z;
,














SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO CALCULATIONS
23
k := 1.3810
To : = 290
Boltzman's constant









N : = k To B FN
ef f
(g-6)
Main Lobe Signal to Noise
Ratio




Gtm 1 Pt Gesm X g
4 tt R I N Lt Lesm
VJ
Side Lobe Signal to Noise
Ratio
(at output of detector)
(g-6)
[*G t s 1 "|
SNRsl := SNRml i
j
t t [_G t m 1 J
Signal Power at ESM from





Gtm I Pt Gesm A. g
[A tt R Lt L
t
esm
Signal Power at ESM from






PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION CALCULATIONS
Frequency Resolution = 2 MHz. ;(li bit word length) R := 2 10
Frequency error (Main lobe and Side lobes) :




ma x 2 3












SNRsl tt PW B





Pulse Repetition interval error (Main lobe and Side lobes)
" 0. 62 PRF


























Angle Of Arrival error
9rms : = 5 Actual rms angular accuracy
(degrees )
<ref : = 4
-8





for the AOA receiving system















Each combination is properly weigthed according to the
quality of its components. The first coefficient is justified
since each parameter has a relative importance, and therefore it
defines the overall weight for each combination:
dAOA = 0. 3
dF = 0. 28
dPRI = 0. 23
dPW = 0. 19
And the second coefficient of each element of the matrix
comes from the need to measure relative to a maximum value of 1
each of the combinations. Then if we just have obtained
measurements from two or three parameters, only one combination
will be se 1 ected
.
wl ; = 0. 3
w2 0. 28
w3 0. 23
w4 . = 0. 19
Weight corresponding to AOA error
Weight corresponding to Freq. error
Weight corresponding to PRI error
Weight corresponding to PW error
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0.25 [dAOAm + dFm + dPRIm + dPWm "|~|
L t t t' tJJ
•Jwl + w2 + w3 [b, 333
wl + w2 + wA lO. 333
Jwl + w3 wA
•Jw2 + w3 + w
0. 333
0. 333
dAOAm + dFm + dPRIm
t t t
dAOAm + dFm + dPWm
t t t
dAOAm + dPRIm + dPWm
t t t








Jwl + wA JO. 5 [dAOAm + dPWm
L L t tjJ
w2 + w3 0. 5 dFm + dPRIm
t t
•Jw2 + wA (0.5- ["dFm + dPWm "]"]
L L t tjJ






Side lobes Probability of identification matrix (g-20)
1- [0.25 ["dAOAs + dFs + dPRIs + dPWs
L L t t t tJJ
Pis ma x
•Jwl + w2 + w3
•Jwl + v/2 + w4
•Jwl + w3 + w4





+ dFs + dPRIs
t t tJJ
OAs + dFs + dPWs 11
t t tJJ
dAOAs + dPRIs + dPWs
t t t
dFs + dPRIs + dPWs
t t t
wl + w2 0. 5 dAOAs + dFs
t t
•Jwl + w3 [0.5 [dAOAs + dPRIs 1
I. L t tj
wl + w4 fo.5 fdAOAs + dPWs
L L t tj.























APPENDIX H: PROBABILITY OF COINCIDENCE (SUPERHET)
Superhet Receiver case
This file calcutates the probability of coincidence for
a Superhet ESM - Frequency hopper (pulse to pulse) Radar type of
encounter based on the theory explained in Wiley's book, that is
considering an approach using window functions.
Radar := READPRN Radar
>rn
























































gamma : = ESM
10

























ae := 8493.3 10
t := 0,1 . . tf
tl := T t
t
Rl := ae + hr









Maximum Range (Radar Horizon):
3







iRmax - Rl - R2

















PROBABILITY OF COINCIDENCE CALCULATIONS
n := 5 Number of frequencies hopped over (h-5)
rl := ra - d (h-6) t4 := 2 PW - d (h-7)
r2 := rf - d (h-8) rll := (Ta - ra) - d (h-9)
r3 := PW - d (h-10) Thop := n PRI (h-11)
Mean time between coincidences:
Ta Ts PRI Thop
Tom := (h-12)
t1t2 t3 + t1t2t4 + rl t3 t4 + r2 r3 t4
Ta Ts PRI Thop
Tos := (h-13)




Ta Ts PRI Thop
rll r2 r3 t4
Pos := (h-15)
Ta Ts PRI Thop
Km : = 1 - Pom (h-16) Ks : = 1 - Pos (h-17)
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Probability of Coincidence vs. Time
Pcml := 1 -
t
Km exp













Probability of coincidence vs. time is written into an output
file:
WR1TEPRN JPcmhop "| := Pcml
L prn j
WR1TEPRN ["Pcshop := Pes 1
prn j
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APPENDIX I; PROBABILIY OF COINCIDENCE (IFM)
I FM Receiver case
This file calcutates the probability of coincidence for an IFM
based ESM-Radar type of encounter based on the theory explained
in Wiley's book, and in Self's article CRefs. 2 and 12] that is,
considering an approach using window functions.
Radar := READPRN [Radar
L P rn J
JESMif m
L Prn J
ESMifm := READPRN fe f
RADAR PARAMETERS









































































ae := 8493.3 10




Rl := ae + hr









Maximum Range (Radar Horizon)
3


















Rl + R2 2 Rl R2 cos h r a d - 8 ( i-4)
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PROBABILITY OF COINCIDENCE CALCULATIONS
n i= 5 Number of frequencies to be hopped over (i-5)
rl := ra - d (i-6) r3 : = 2 PW - d (i-7)
t2 := PW - d (i-6) Thop := n PRI (i-9)
rll := (Ta - 10 ra) - d (i-10)
Mean time between coincidences:
Ta Thop PRI
Tom := Main lobe (i-11)
rl r2 + rl t3 + r2 r3
Ta Thop PRI
Tos := Side lobe (i-12)
rll r2 + rll t3 + t2 t3
Instantaneous Coincidence Probability
rl r2 t3
Pom := Main lobe (i-13)
Ta Thop PRI
rll t2t3
P o s : = Side lobe (i-14)
Ta Thop PRI
Km : = 1 - Pom (i-15) Ks := 1 - Pos (i-16)
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Probability of Coincidence vs. Time






Mai n 1 obe ( i-17)




S i de 1 obe ( i-18)







= Pes 1 IFM
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APPENDIX J; PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT
This file reads all other probability files and calculates the
final Probability of Intercept as function of time, PQItt), for
various conditions.
GET THE ITERATION TIME AND STEP SIZEl
ESM := READPRN ESM
prn
ESMifm := READPRN JESM i f
m
L P rn J
T := ESM
20
t : = 0,1 . . tf
tf := ESM
21
tl : = t T
t
1.- READ ALL THE OTHER FILES
a.) Superhet files
Pdgm := READPRN jPdgm
prn j
Pdgs : = READPRN [Pdgs
L P rn J
Pcmhop := READPRN |Pcmhop
pr n J
Pidm : = READPRN [Pidm
L P rn J
Pcshop := READPRN PcshopiP
L Prn J
Pids := READPRN IPids
I. Prn J
132
b. ) !FM files:
PdgmlFM := READPRN !>d gm I FM PdgsIFM t= READPRN fpd gs I FM
L pi
j
>rn J |_ prn J
PcmllFM := READPRN frcm 1 1 FM 1 PcslIFM := READPRN JPcs 1 I FM
L Pm J L Prn J
PidmlFM := READPRN iP i dm I FM PidalFM := READPRN TP i ds I FM
L pm J L P rn J
2.- PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT FOR A SUPERHET RECEIVER
a.) Probability of Intercept (Mainlobe):
POIgm := Pdgm Pcmhop Pidm (j-1)
t t t t
b. ) Probability of Intercept (Sidelobes):
POIgs := Pdgs Pcshop Pids (j-2)
t t t t
c. ) Overall Probablility of Intercept (Superhet Receiver):
POIg := POIgm + POIgs - POIgm POIgs (j-3)
t t t t t
3.- PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT FOR AN I FM BASED RECEIVER
) Probability of Intercept (Mainlobe)t
POIifmm := PdgmlFM PcmllFM PidmlFM (j-A)
t t t t
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b. ) Probability of Intercept ( Side 1 obes J 5
POIifms := PdgglFM PcslIFM PidsIFM
t t t t
( j-5)
c. ) Overall Probability of Intercept (IFM Receiver)
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system analysis.

